Bad Atheist Arguments: “I Just Reject One More God than You” (2 of 2)

Andy Bannister The Atheist Who Didn’t Exist bookThis is part 3b of a critique of The Atheist Who Didn’t Exist: The Dreadful Consequences of Bad Arguments (2015) by Andy Bannister (part 1 here). The book promises to critique a number of atheist arguments.
This post wraps up my critique of Chapter 3, “The Aardvark in the Artichokes.” In the first half, I responded to Bannister’s critique of the atheist argument that the Christian rejects hundreds or thousands of gods, while the atheist just goes one god further. He’s now moved on to argue that Christianity is special, and lumping it in with the unwashed masses of religions is wrong.
Why Christianity is unique
Christianity’s big difference compared to Zeus, Thor, the Flying Spaghetti Monster, and the other gods is:

Every single one of those other entities is an object inside the universe. God, on the other hand, according to Christianity is the creator and sustainer of the universe, the author of the story.

So then make up a new character and call him the Creator. Make him outside. Now Yahweh has a competitor.
You don’t like that he was just invented? All right, then revisit this character after 2000 years has passed so that the origins of this tale are clouded and it has become legend and mythology. That’s Christianity’s advantage—not that it’s correct but that it’s venerable and uncheckable.
Bannister simply declares that God is the creator. That’s not good enough: he must prove it. Without evidence, this is just theology, not an argument.
I’d also recommend that he read up on the Combat Myth and then tell me that Yahweh is in a completely different category. Today’s timeless, outside-the-universe god isn’t what Yahweh was initially. He’s evolved. (Y’know how Superman at first was just pretty strong and could “leap tall buildings in a single bound” but then became insanely strong and could fly? Like that.)
And let me take issue with this claim of uniqueness—that the Christian god’s relationship with the universe is somehow unique. The Greek creation myth (to take just one) has Chaos creating Gaia (Earth). She created Uranus (heavens), and their offspring were the Titans. Cronus (the youngest Titan) was the father of Zeus, the ruler of the pantheon that’s now in power.
That sounds about as sensible (or ridiculous) as the two creation stories that Genesis opens with. Bannister wants you to ignore the man behind the curtain and look instead at the modern Christian view where God walks hand-in-hand with modern cosmology. God is now said to have triggered the Big Bang, sustain the laws of physics, exist outside of time and space, and so on, ideas that would mystify the original audience for Genesis.
No, that won’t do—you’re saddled with the pre-scientific thinking in your holy book that makes your origin myth no more compelling than the Greek one.
How can you dismiss religions without understanding them?
Bannister next complains:

The atheist making [the claim that the world’s religions are essentially the same] has not investigated all of them—probably not any of them—and is instead assuming that they must all be more or less similar to the characterless Catholicism or pedestrian Protestantism they half-remember from their youth.

Bannister has a PhD in Quranic Studies, so he has studied at least one additional religion in great depth. I wonder though if he and I are much different with respect to the other religions. He’s right that I’m no expert in the other thousand (to pick a number) of religions in history, but how can he criticize me for rejecting those thousand religions without cause? Didn’t he do the same thing?
Sure, let’s acknowledge that Christianity is different from all the other religions, but why is that a bold claim? Each religion is different from all the other religions. And as far as I’ve been able to determine, they all have the same unmet burden of proof. You’re right that I haven’t thoroughly investigated Santeria, Baha’i, Raelianism, and the hundreds of others. If you’ve compared them all against Christianity, show us.
Christianity vs. Islam
Returning to Bannister’s expertise in Islam, he tells us, “On almost every major point of Christian doctrine, I think it is safe to say that Islam teaches the opposite.”
But they’ve got the same god! Islam accepts the Torah (Genesis through Deuteronomy), so whatever properties you pull out for Yahweh you must assign to Allah as well. You can say that Mohammed took things in a very different direction to give Allah a unique character, but Christianity did the same with its New Testament.
You can focus on their common origin or their divergence, but let’s go where Bannister is pointing. He says Christianity and Islam are very different—okay, they’re very different. So what? This example only emphasizes the made-up nature of both religions. How does this support his thesis that Christianity is not just different from all the other religions but the only one that’s true?
Atheists aren’t allowed to play with God’s toys
Bannister wants to banish atheists from the field of intellectual discourse, though not for any good reason.

Truth, the pursuit of knowledge, the existence of ultimate values such as justice—those are grounded, ultimately, in God. And so to pick these things up and wield them as weapons against God is to play by his rules.

Give me a break. These things come from humans. Don’t flatter yourself that your God gives truth, justice, and so on to humans when they were humans’ to begin with. But if you have evidence of your remarkable claim, provide it.
And if this turns on the word “ultimate” (as in objective or absolute or God-grounded), I await the evidence for that as well. Ordinary justice is defined in the dictionary without the word “ultimate.”
Continue with chapter 4.

I cannot imagine a God who rewards and punishes the objects of his creation,
whose purposes are modeled after our own—
a God, in short, who is but a reflection of human frailty.
— Albert Einstein

Image credit: Ketzirah Lesser & Art Drauglis, flickr, CC

Bad Atheist Arguments: “I Just Reject One More God than You”

Andy Bannister The Atheist Who Didn’t Exist bookThis is part 3 of a critique of The Atheist Who Didn’t Exist: The Dreadful Consequences of Bad Arguments (2015) by Andy Bannister (part 1 here). The book promises to critique a number of atheist arguments.
Chapter 3: The Aardvark in the Artichokes
In today’s episode, Fred is furious because something destroyed his garden. He’s considering and dismissing possible culprits—from aardvarks to zebras—while our hero points out the clues for rabbits. Fred says that it’s not rabbits, either. You’ve dismissed all those other animals? Well, he just goes one animal further.
This is obviously supposed to mimic the atheist argument used by Richard Dawkins and others that the Christian rejects hundreds or thousands of gods; why not just one god further like the atheist?
Bannister’s harsh critique: “To describe this as a bad argument is to flirt somewhat casually with understatement.”
Game on!
(I’ve responded to this argument in another post, but this chapter has some new ideas that I’d like to respond to.)
Examples to illustrate the error
Bannister lists several examples to illustrate the problem.

  • The atheist says, “You’re an atheist with respect to every other religions’ god(s)” and then goes on to disbelieve that final one. Similarly, a married man can be a bachelor with respect every other woman in the world. Would it make sense to disbelieve that final one, his wife? This isn’t analogous. This is exists vs. married to—hardly the same thing. The existence of women isn’t the question when we’re talking about bachelorhood.
  • He imagines Col. Mustard in the game Clue saying, “All the other characters are innocent! You should go one character more and let me go as well.” The rules say there is exactly one murderer. And we understand murders in real life—there must be one or more murderers. Zero is not an option. Contrast that with the number of gods that exist, which could be zero.
  • He imagines a biologist saying that he rejects evolution because he’s rejected all the other explanations and has just gone “one theorem further.” If the scientist has reasons to reject evolution, no problem. It’s possible for science to have zero theories to explain a phenomenon, though science is looking for one theory. Again, this is different from religion, where zero gods is plausible.

Bannister’s critique to summarize his examples: “The argument leaks like a rusty colander” and “The argument is, to use a technical term from academic philosophy, bonkers.”
No, what’s bonkers is the idea that his examples are analogous to the subject at hand. All I see them doing is raising dust to cloud the issue. (But then that might be the goal.)
The general problem
Bannister generalizes the argument: never pick something out of a collection because it leaves you open to the challenge, “Hold on! You rejected all these other ones, so why not just go one further and reject them all?” He phrases it this way:

You see, the underlying problem with the “One God Less” argument is that it goes too far. If the argument were valid, it would have a devastating consequence, namely that it would behave like a universal acid and erode all exclusive truth claims, be they in theology, law, or science.

It goes too far only when you force it there. Sometimes “None of the above” is an option and sometimes not. You can suggest that a Christian believe in zero gods, but you can’t tell a vegan to adopt zero dietary regimes (they have to eat something).
Let’s return to Fred’s poor garden, ravaged the previous night by some kind of animal. The constant fight of gardeners against animals that eat their crops is well understood. You know that something trashed Fred’s garden, so “this had zero causes” isn’t an option.
And we’re supposed to see this as analogous to the religion case? Compare many animals with the many religions. We know that all these animals exist. In sharp contrast, most religions must be false and they might all be. There are one or more causes of Fred’s damaged garden, while there could be zero or more gods that actually exist. “Zero” is absolutely not an answer in the garden case, while it is a very live option in the religion case.
Not all religions are the same, y’know!
Bannister now wants to argue that when you compare religions, Christianity comes out decisively on top. He begins by scolding his favorite atheist, Richard Dawkins.

Dawkins has made a fairly basic mistake, namely failing to notice that when multiple explanations are offered for something—be that a murder, a scientific theory, or a religious claim—we don’t immediately assume that all are equally likely.

All religions have the same Achilles Heel—supernatural belief. If that single foundational assumption is wrong, then they’re all wrong—all equally wrong and all in the same way. Only if the supernatural does indeed exist are the differences interesting and worth comparing. Without the supernatural, those differences are trivia, and Bannister does nothing to argue for the existence of the supernatural.
And then, in a startling addition to the conversation, Bannister states: “It often comes as a shock to many atheists to know that there is surprisingly good evidence for God.”
Wow—are we to get some argument to support his just-trust-me handwaving for Christianity’s remarkable claims? Nope, just a link to Alvin Plantinga’s “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments.” (I’ve skimmed it in the past without finding anything interesting. Point out anything you find noteworthy.)
Conclude this argument in part 3b.

I’m a friendly enough sort of chap . . .
I’m not a hostile person to meet.
But I think it’s important to realise
that when two opposite points of view are expressed with equal intensity,
the truth does not necessarily lie exactly halfway between them.
It is possible for one side to be simply wrong.
— Richard Dawkins

Image credit: David Whelan, flickr, CC

A Pro-Christian Argument For A Change: the Transcendental Argument

This is an excerpt from my novel, Cross Examined: An Unconventional Spiritual Journey.
The Players:

  • Rev. Samuel Hargrove is a well-known pastor and debater. 
  • Prof. Putnam is taking the atheist side in the debate. He’s a physics professor from USC.
  • Paul Winston is Samuel’s 23-year-old acolyte. At this point in the story, he’s still shaken by the death of his fiancée in the earthquake, a few weeks earlier.

The Setting: Los Angeles in 1906, just after the San Francisco earthquake. We’re in Samuel’s church, watching his annual apologetics debate.
Samuel stressed to the audience the importance of understanding apologetics. He listed several Bible verses to support this, with special attention given to 1 Peter 3:15, “Be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh you a reason for the hope that is in you.” He noted that Genesis does not begin with an argument for God’s existence but instead takes this for granted, and Samuel justified this with another verse: “The invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen so that men are without excuse.”
“You want to see the hand of God?” Samuel said. “Then just look around you. These are powerful arguments, but again they satisfy only believers like most of us. Today we will put those arguments aside. The tools today are reason and logic, but these are friends of the Christian. We have nothing to fear from them; in fact, we invite critique because we must know that Christianity is valid and strong. Questioning is good. The apostle Paul said that if our faith in Christ is misplaced, then ‘we are to be pitied more than all men.’ So bring on the attack. Our fortress is built on the Eternal Rock.”
Samuel wrapped up his introductory remarks by thanking his opponent for participating. He then stated the topic of the debate: “Does God exist?” with Professor Putnam taking the negative position. The professor smiled slightly in acknowledgement and took in the audience with a relaxed face.
If Putnam didn’t yet know that he was playing Samuel’s game, on Samuel’s court, and by Samuel’s rules, he found out soon enough. Samuel asked the professor’s permission to begin the debate with an informal chat to explore the issues for the benefit of the audience. This was unexpected, but the regulars in the audience knew to expect that. Whether preaching or debating, Samuel was rarely boring.
With both men seated at the table, Samuel began by asking for the professor’s agreement to a logical statement. The professor brushed at something on the sleeve of his gray suit and identified it as the Law of Noncontradiction. Samuel threw out another one. Again the professor made a quick identification: this time, the Law of the Excluded Middle.
Samuel looked delighted as if a precocious child had answered a question above his age. “Clearly you are familiar with the laws of logic—surely much more so than I.”
“That’s only to be expected. Logic is what I base my research on.”
“Then let me ask you this: why are these laws true? Why should there be a Law of Noncontradiction?”
The professor looked up, then crossed his arms and rocked slightly in his chair. He opened his mouth, paused, and then closed it. Paul slid forward in his seat as he watched the man’s unease. Finally, the professor said, “We use logic because it works.”
“It does indeed work, but why? Why should the universe be bound to obey these laws? Surely the reason logic is true is not ‘just because.’ ”
Again a pause. The professor, slight and scholarly behind his glasses, made quite a contrast at the same table with Samuel, tall and broad and with a more-than-generous voice. In his modest tone, the professor said, “Well, logic is a convention.”
“A convention? You mean like a custom? Are the laws of logic arbitrary so that we might have one set while the French would get along quite happily with a different set—like we measure distances in feet while the French measure in meters?” Samuel turned to the audience. “Oh, I do so enjoy the spring, when the new laws of logic come out of Paris.”
Laughter swept the audience, and Paul leaned back, grinning. Putnam pursed his lips and shook his head, and Samuel raised his hands as if in submission. “I apologize, Professor. We’re just having a little chat here, so I thought you wouldn’t mind my taking the liberty. No, of course you don’t see logic to be as changeable as fashion. We agree that logic is universal. I’m simply saying that if you can’t tell me why that is the case, I can.”
The professor leaned forward and his voice rose slightly in pitch. “We’re in the same boat. Your justification for logic is no stronger than mine.”
“Not at all. You deny the supernatural source of logic, but I don’t. Logic comes from God; it is a consequence of God. The believer can point to his source of logic, but the atheist has no justification.”
The professor swept the crowd with his hand. “Look around you—atheists are logical. Atheists are rational.”
“Yes, atheists are rational, but only because they are dishonest to their own professed principles. The irony is that the atheist must borrow from the Christian worldview to reject it. Atheists deny the very God whose existence makes their reasoning possible.”
The professor took out a handkerchief and dabbed his upper lip and forehead. “Christianity didn’t invent logic. The ancient Greeks preceded the Christians and were pioneers in logic—Aristotle, for example.”
“I agree,” Samuel said. “But that doesn’t change the fact that logic is a consequence of God’s existence. Non-Christians are welcome to use it, but it comes from God.”
“Why can’t we presume that logic is transcendent—that it’s always existed?”
“It is indeed transcendent. But that doesn’t answer the question why. Why has logic always existed?”
The professor glanced up at the ceiling before continuing. “Logic just exists. It has certain properties. It’s just a fundamental part of reality.”
Samuel smoothed his mustache with the back of his right hand. “Oh, so that’s how the game is played? All right: God just exists. God is just a fundamental part of reality. But can we just define things into existence? Of course not. No, that’s not an argument. I apologize for being so persistent, but I must return to my original question, which remains unanswered: why is logic true?”
The professor made a growling “Rrr!” sound and said, “You don’t understand.” He paused as if collecting his thoughts and then scowled. “Reverend Hargrove, is this an interrogation or a dialogue? Will I get an opportunity to ask questions?”
“I do apologize. I have indeed monopolized the conversation. Please, Professor, go right ahead.”
Putnam rummaged through a small stack of papers, putting first one sheet on top and then another. “All right,” he said. “Why are there so many religions around the world? Doesn’t this say that each culture invents a religion to suit itself?” The audience hushed.
“The world’s many religions say that people have an innate urge to discover their Maker,” Samuel said. “This universal hunger in every human bosom points to a God who can satisfy that hunger.” Paul smiled. Another point scored, and the professor’s face showed the hit.
The professor leafed through his papers again. “Well, answer me this. The Christian God is described as a loving god. And yet we have disease and famine and war. Wouldn’t such a god put an end to this, if he existed?”
“Who knows what disasters might have happened but haven’t because of divine providence? We don’t see the headline ‘Thousands not Dead Because of Disaster that Didn’t Happen’ simply because we don’t know what God has shielded us from. Indeed, it is arrogant to imagine that we are smart enough to understand, let alone critique, the actions of the Creator of the universe. And the Fall of Adam and Eve—the original sin in the Garden of Eden—explains the imperfect world we live in.”
“Rrr!” More paper shuffling. The professor’s voice became somewhat shrill and he spoke more quickly. “Tell me this: why believe the Bible? You don’t believe Homer’s Iliad. You don’t believe the ancient books of other religions.”
“The story of Jesus was written down just a few decades after the fact, and we have perhaps thousands of ancient manuscripts of the books of the Bible. This lets us recreate the original documents with great precision. And many non-Christian historians of that period document the truth of Jesus’s life outside the Bible. By contrast, we might have a biography written centuries after the death of a historical figure such as Alexander the Great, and we regard that as truth. And when you consider that the men closest to Jesus were martyred for their beliefs, surely no one would die to defend a story he knew wasn’t true.”
“Well, history is not really my area of expertise.” The professor tapped a new sheet that he had placed on top of the pile. “All right, the Bible documents slavery among the Israelites, but God does nothing to stop the practice. Given this, how can the Bible be called a book of morality?”
“First, keep in mind that the Bible documents many customs that have nothing to do with godly living; they were simply practices of tribal people in a place and time far different than our own. As for slavery, we’d still have slavery in America today if it weren’t for people like Harriet Beecher Stowe, John Brown, William Lloyd Garrison, the Quakers, and others—all Christians guided by Christian principles.”
Samuel looked over for more questions, but the professor seemed spent. The silence lengthened, and Paul felt the small man’s discomfort. He couldn’t imagine being on that stage with hundreds of people staring, waiting for a mistake, enjoying his distress.
Samuel slid his chair back. “With your permission, Professor, shall we begin the debate?” Putnam yielded with a gesture of his hand, saying nothing.
Samuel walked to the podium and began his prepared remarks, a proud oration that surveyed a number of compelling arguments. Instead of doing the same when it was his turn, the professor used his time to rebut Samuel’s opening points. That’s a bad move, Paul thought. You’ve allowed your opponent to select all the arguments. He sensed that the contest was already over and leaned forward with his elbows on his knees. He wondered if the professor had already used up his own points in his questions to Samuel. The result was that the entire debate would be fought on Samuel’s territory—and this was terrain that Samuel knew very well.
Paul took a personal interest in the progression of the debate, not just because he was rooting for Samuel, but because he had spent so long helping him prepare. Though Samuel was a natural speaker and an accomplished debater, he still took preparation for each debate seriously and this year had assigned Paul some of the research tasks. Samuel had thoroughly explained the various arguments from each side and critiqued their strengths and weaknesses. “You’ll be doing this yourself some day,” Samuel had said.
The professor gamely held up his end of the argument, but he was outmatched. His voice became thinner and he didn’t use all the time that was available to him. His eyes and gestures often pleaded with the crowd as if to ask for their acceptance of an argument he couldn’t quite put into words, one that seemed just out of his grasp. The rebuttals were often little more than “I don’t agree with you there” or “You’ll have to do better than that.”
Samuel wrapped up his final remarks. “Let me return to the original question, which, after all this time, still has not been answered from the atheist position: why is logic true? Professor Putnam says that I have no answer to this question, but I do—it’s just that he doesn’t like it. God created the world, and logic is a consequence.
“We can agree that logic is universal. It’s also abstract—in other words, it has no physical presence like a book or a table. And logic is unchanging, unlike the things we see around us that grow or decay over time. Aside from logic—and perhaps what is built on logic, like mathematics—we know of just one other thing with these properties, and that is God.
“Let me be clear that I respect the professor’s logical skill. He’s a scientist, and I’m sure he uses logic very well in his work. The only problem is that he must borrow from the Christian position to do so. By his own logic, logic can’t exist. In rejecting God, the atheist has rejected his source of logic and has therefore eliminated his ability to use it. Without its Christian foundation, this entire debate wouldn’t make sense.”
The professor had the last block of time, and he used it up like a football team that knows it’s beaten and is eager only to run out the clock and go home. When he finished, the moderator thanked both participants and the audience applauded. Samuel beamed at the crowd, while the professor collected his papers and stood to leave even before the applause was over.
The reporters left promptly—to file their stories, Paul supposed—but people milled about afterwards, seemingly eager to savor the night.
“Another sacrificial lamb, eh, Pastor?” said one man with a smile.
“I think this was the most impressive debate yet,” said another.
“You should call these the ‘Loose Canon’ debates. You know—’canon,’ like scripture,” said a third.
Twenty minutes after the debate had ended, the church was still half full of supporters. A few people encouraged Samuel to speak and the call for an encore swept through the crowd. Samuel mounted the podium in response to the curtain call and gave a short epilogue. As the audience took their seats, he emphasized the importance of apologetics to his ministry and encouraged everyone to be an ambassador.
Paul leaned back in his pew and smiled. It seemed to him that no one in the city knew more about the defense of Christianity than this man, and surely none could beat him.
Read more about the book and an extended excerpt from the beginning here.

Martyrdom has always been a proof of the intensity,
never of the correctness of a belief.
— Arthur Schnitzler

Bad Atheist Arguments: “Atheism Isn’t a Claim”

Andy Bannister The Atheist Who Didn’t Exist bookThis is part 2 of a critique of The Atheist Who Didn’t Exist: The Dreadful Consequences of Bad Arguments (2015) by Andy Bannister (part 1). The book promises to critique a number of atheist arguments.
Chapter 2: The Scandinavian Skeptic
Each chapter begins with a silly story to illustrate the problem. In today’s episode, Fred is a friend of the author who disbelieves in Sweden. When our hero asks for evidence, Fred says, “You think that my denial of Sweden is an actual claim of some kind, that it’s a belief. But it isn’t. It’s a non-belief. There’s nothing I need to explain—rather, I’m talking about something I lack, namely a belief in Sweden, so I don’t need to give any evidence for it.” He says he doesn’t have to give evidence for his nonbelief in Atlantis, either.
Who has the burden of proof?
Bannister is annoyed by people who similarly say, “Atheism isn’t a claim. It’s just a non-belief in the claim ‘There is a god.’” Avoiding the burden of proof in this way may be a smart rhetorical move, he says, but it won’t work. “The first problem is that the statement ‘Atheism is just non-belief in God’ proves too much.” Cats have a non-belief in God—does that make them atheists? How about potatoes? Rocks? The color green?
This isn’t necessarily a ridiculous definition. Babies are atheists by this thinking, and that can make some sense. They begin with no god belief as a default, and they can evaluate and choose (or get indoctrinated into) a religion when they’re able to understand.
Another definition is that atheism is simply a “No” to the question, “Do you believe in gods?”
My own approach is that I’ll take a stand. I think that the evidence points to no gods, and I’ll make a positive argument for atheism. There are dozens of posts at this blog that do just that. But I shouldn’t have to since I’m not making the extraordinary claim—that’s the asymmetry that Bannister ignores. In the case of an extraordinary claim (and “There is a god” is certainly one), the default position is the denial of that claim: “There is a god” vs. “there isn’t.”
“Humans have been medically probed by aliens in spaceships” vs. “didn’t happen.”
“The Loch Ness monster exists” (or Atlantis or unicorns or leprechauns) vs. “nope.”
If the extraordinary claim isn’t supported with extraordinary evidence, I’m obliged to return to the default position. My position (no gods) is the default one, and it is my option to get its benefits. I don’t have to make a positive case. If you don’t like the asymmetry of our positions, don’t embrace an extraordinary claim.
And why is the Christian making a big deal about this? He’s characterizing the burden of proof as a burden. If he demands reciprocity before he will make his case, he’s missing an opportunity. Does he want me to earn the right to hear the Good News? Why not say that he will gladly make his case and simply hope that the atheist follows his lead?
I think it’s because his defense of Christianity is weak, and he wants to improve his overall argument by having something to attack as well. But never mind, Bannister is adamant that he doesn’t want to be the only one having to defend his worldview. “If my atheist friends wish to join the conversation sensibly—and I believe that atheism deserves its seat at the table of discussion as much as any other world view—then they must recognize their belief for what it is and engage accordingly.”
This refusal to be the only one defending his worldview is a popular view within apologetics circles, but it’s still indefensible. As another example, I respond to Greg Koukl’s version here.
True vs. false? Ordinary vs. extraordinary? No—beliefs are active vs. passive.
Bannister says that we’re categorizing beliefs wrong. We should use active vs. passive.

There are a near-infinite number of things I passively don’t believe in, if you were to press me: everything from floating celestial teapots to unicycling unicorns. . . . On the other hand, there are plenty of things I actively disbelieve: for example, I do not believe that George Mallory and Andrew Irvine made it to the summit of Everest in June 1924, beating Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay by some thirty years. . . . For our active non-beliefs, disbeliefs that consume our time and energy, for those, yes, we do need to give reasons.

I’m seeing three categories of beliefs:

  • A, beliefs that are true (Sweden exists)
  • B, beliefs that are false (Atlantis exists)
  • C, things you could have a belief about but don’t (Bannister’s example: whether there are hippos in the bathroom).

He wants to call A an active belief, ignore B and hope no one asks him about it, and call C a passive belief. I want to focus instead on A (true beliefs) and B (false beliefs) and ignore C, since we’re both in agreement that no one cares about C.
Another useful way is to re-sort categories A and B into two different categories, extraordinary beliefs and mundane beliefs. Bannister doesn’t like either approach (true/false or extraordinary/mundane) because it doesn’t get him what he wants, parity with atheism.
He would come closer by dropping the demand that “atheism is a belief” and instead push for “atheism is a worldview.” Yes, maybe atheism is more correctly “the lack of a religious worldview,” but at least he would be closer.
Atheism leads to nihilism?
What follows from atheism? He quotes atheist Friedrich Nietzsche: “When one gives up the Christian faith, one pulls the right to Christian morality out from under one’s feet. This morality is by no means self-evident.”
What “Christian morality”? Do you mean “Western morality”? Do you mean the innate human morality that Christianity pretends to give back to us? What is unique about Christian morality that you don’t find in other cultures? Yes, there is non-self-evident morality that is unique to Christianity (or Abrahamic religions), but that part sucks. Don’t get me started about the crazy immorality God condones in the Old Testament.
And then there’s the nihilism. He quotes an atheist:

[The atheist] must be bold to weave a bower of “endless night” upon the very edge of the abyss of abysses. This precarious cat’s-cradle he must make his intellectual habitation. It is not only belief in God that must be abandoned, not only all hope of life after death, but all trust in an ordained moral order . . .

and blah, blah, blah. You also have no belief in Norse religion and must abandon all hope of Valhalla. Oh my gosh! How can you go on??
I can appreciate that reality is daunting for some people. Perhaps it’s hard being part of the generation that’s supposed to be in charge. But as for me and my house, we follow the evidence.
Atheism a religion?
He seems especially desperate at chapter’s end when he quotes an atheist: “Atheism is a religion of sorts, or can be.” And then a sociologist who said that religion is “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things.”
Doesn’t “worldview” work well enough? Why try to shoehorn atheism into the Religion category? Is it that misery loves company? Whenever I see this argument, it always sounds like, “Don’t tell me that I’m stupid for believing a religion! You’re just as stupid, since you’ve got a religion, too!” Casting a net this wide would capture many sports fans as well. And perhaps I’m just old fashioned, but I won’t call something a religion if it doesn’t have supernatural beliefs.
This is just another attempt to deny the asymmetry. You are the one making the incredible claim. Prove it.
Continue to part 3.

Too often we enjoy the comfort of opinion
without the discomfort of thought.
— John F. Kennedy

Image credit: Arild, flickr, CC

Bad Atheist Arguments: Book Review of “The Atheist Who Didn’t Exist”

Andy Bannister The Atheist Who Didn’t Exist bookThe Atheist Who Didn’t Exist (2015) by Andy Bannister promises to critique a number of atheist arguments. The subtitle is, “The dreadful consequences of bad arguments.” I’m on board with bad arguments having bad consequences, so I’m curious to hear about these bad atheist arguments.
Scope of the book
In the introduction, Ravi Zacharias says, “Time and again the atheist is unable to answer the fundamental questions of life, such as ‘is there a moral framework to life?’” In the first place, I disagree, but more importantly: the Christian thinks he can answer these questions?? Unfortunately, though the author seems to understand his need to show that Christianity is more than just groundless claims, all he provides are a couple of references and apologies that pro-Christian arguments aren’t within the scope of the book. It’s like a Creationist approach in this regard—all attack and no defense.
The tone is deliberately lighthearted, often to an extreme of silliness, though it was too full of insults for me to find it amusing. I can’t in one paragraph frisk in field of lavender clover with a miniature pink rhinoceros who plays show tunes through a calliope in its horn and farts cotton-candy-scented soap bubbles but then two paragraphs later be lectured that my arguments are embarrassing, “extremely bad,” or “disastrous.” The flippant tone got old fast.
Bannister is writing from a UK context, and some of his “What’s the big deal?” comments in response to Christian excesses didn’t translate well to the religious environment in the U.S. Christian privilege is indeed a big deal in the U.S., especially for atheists living in the Bible Belt.
Chapter 1. The Loch Ness Monster’s Moustache
He begins with the 2009 atheist bus campaign sponsored by the British Humanist Association that put the following slogan on hundreds of buses in the UK: “There’s probably no god. Now stop worrying and enjoy your life.” I remember being impressed when I first heard about this campaign. It seemed edgy—public proclamations were more appropriate for Christian messages—but the message is pretty tame.
If you’re going to give a reason to reconsider religion, there are plenty of harsher ones. Maybe: “The Thirty Years’ War killed 8 million people in the name of God. I hope you’re happy, God.” Or: “Christianity makes you do strange things” with a photo of a child killed by parents who insisted on prayer instead of medicine or a teen driven to suicide by Christian bullies.
But the mild “There’s probably no god. Now stop worrying and enjoy your life” still exasperates Bannister. He says,

The slogan, despite its friendly pink letters, is a perfect example of a really bad argument. An argument so bad, so disastrous, in fact, that one has to wonder what its sponsors were thinking. …
Much of contemporary atheism thrives on poor arguments and cheap sound bites, advancing claims that simply don’t stand up to scrutiny.

Only after several pages of throat clearing do we get a glimmer of an actual complaint.

One might begin by noting the preachy, condescending, and hectoring tone.

With that gentle slogan? Oh, please. Drop some of your Christian privilege and grow a thicker skin.
How big a deal is this?
Bannister next asks, “What’s the connection between the non-existence of something and any effect, emotional or otherwise?” Do you complain about unicorns or the Flying Spaghetti Monster not existing?
In a dozen places, Banister writes something like this that makes me wonder if he’s just not paying attention. No, we don’t complain about unicorns—they don’t exist, and they don’t cause problems. Christianity, on the other hand, does exist, and Christianity and Christians cause problems.
He next gives Christian author Francis Spufford’s critique:

I’m sorry—enjoy your life? Enjoy your life? I’m not making some kind of neo-puritan objection to enjoyment.

If you’re not causing problems, that’s great, but if you’re not aware of the problems, you’re also not paying attention. Christian adults live burdened with guilt. Christian children startle awake at a noise and wonder if this is the beginning of the imminent Armageddon. Christian homosexuals deny themselves romantic relationships to satisfy an absent god. This isn’t true for all Christians, of course, but imposing a worldview burdened with Bronze Age nonsense and informed by faith rather than evidence has consequences.
Bannister wants to highlight the problem with the slogan by proposing this variant: “There’s probably no Loch Ness Monster, so stop worrying and enjoy your life.” Imagine telling this to someone down on his luck, someone who’s been kicked around by fate. Would he be cheered by this new knowledge?
No, because the Loch Ness Monster has zero impact in anyone’s life. Remove Nessie’s non-existent impact from someone’s life and nothing has changed. But do I really have to explain that god belief has a big impact on many people? For example, the United States has a famously secular constitution, and Christians nibble at the edges like rats looking for ways to dismantle the its separation of church and state for their benefit. See the difference?
Do you understand the consequences of atheism?
He wants to force atheists to take their own medicine.

If the atheist bus slogan is right and there is no God, there’s nobody out there who is ultimately going to help with any pulling. You’re alone in a universe that cares as little about you (and your enjoyment) as it does about the fate of the amoeba, the ant or the aardvark.

First, I hope we can agree that it’s vital for us to see reality correctly. If there isn’t a god out there, best we figure that out, come to terms with it, and shape society in accord with that knowledge.
And you’re seriously wagging your finger at us to warn that our worldview has no beneficent Sky Daddy? Yes, we know—we’re atheists! It’s not like the heavens shower us with benefits that disbelief will shut off. God already does nothing for us now—that’s the point.
You know what improves society? We do. We’re not perfect, and some of the problems are of our own making, but let’s acknowledge where we have improved things. Slavery is illegal. Smallpox is gone. Clean water, vaccines, and antibiotics improve health. Artificial fertilizer and improved strains of wheat feed billions and make famine unlikely. We can anticipate natural disasters. (More here and here.) God has done nothing to improve society.
As for the universe not caring about us, well, yeah. Is there any evidence otherwise? If so, make a case.
Atheists like Stalin are evil
A popular Christian argument shifts attention from Christianity’s excesses (wars, Crusades, and so on) to bad atheist leaders like Stalin.

What about atheism’s own chequered history? Stalin was responsible for the deaths of some 20 million people, while the death toll for Mao’s regime is at least double that.

Richard Dawkins lampooned this argument with this tweet: “Stalin, Hitler and Saddam Hussein were evil, murdering dictators. All had moustaches. Therefore moustaches are evil.”
Yes, Stalin was a bad man, but why? Was it the mustache? Was it his atheism? No, Stalin was a dictator, and dictators don’t like alternate power structures like the church. Religion was competition, so Stalin made it illegal. They didn’t do anything in the name of atheism. Lack of a god belief is no reason to order that people be killed. (I expose the Stalin argument here and here.)
Bannister concludes that the bus slogan and the moustache argument “are both examples of not just weak arguments, but extremely bad arguments.” Uh huh. You’ll have to tell us why some day. He continues, “I have been struck by how many of my atheist friends are deeply embarrassed by these terrible skeptical arguments.”
Oh, dear. He’s disappointed in me, and I would be embarrassed at these arguments, too, if I had any sense.
Sorry, I’m not riding that train. Give me less outrage and more argument.
Argument by sound bite
Bannister laments, “The atheist bus advertisement illustrates the danger not just of poor arguments, but especially of argument by sound bite.”
This is coming from a Christian? Where some think that evolution is overturned by mocking it as “from goo to you via the zoo”? Where church signs have slogans like “How will you spend eternity—Smoking or Nonsmoking?”? Where emotion is the argument, not intellect? Get your own house in order first, pal.
Continue with part 2.

Wandering in a vast forest at night,
I have only a faint light to guide me.
A stranger appears and says to me:
“My friend, you should blow out your candle
in order to find your way more clearly.”
This stranger is a theologian.
— Denis Diderot

Image credit: Wikipedia

Explanation for Objective Morality? Another Fail.

objective moralityLet’s revisit the question of objective morality. We have another contestant who thinks he can convince us that objective morality exists.
But before we consider that, here’s Christian apologist Tim Keller to set the stage:

The Nazis who exterminated Jews may have claimed that they didn’t feel it was immoral at all. We don’t care. We don’t care if they sincerely felt they were doing a service to humanity. They ought not to have done it. We do not only have moral feelings, but we also have an ineradicable belief that moral standards exist, outside of us, by which our internal moral feelings are evaluated.

“They ought not have done it”? How do you know?
This is the problem with how this topic is typically handled within Christian apologetics: a moral situation with one obvious answer is tossed out, and we’re supposed to infer ourselves into the apologist’s moral viewpoint. This is insufficient. There’s a difference between a widely believed or strongly felt moral opinion and objective morality. Don’t make the remarkable claim of objective morality (Keller’s “moral standards exist, outside of us”) without evidence.
Enter our contestant …
Let’s give a warm welcome to J. Warner Wallace of the Cold Case Christianity blog. He interviewed me on his podcast once, and we’ve had occasional email exchanges. He’s unfailingly polite and a good reminder to all of us that dialing back the anger makes one’s arguments more palatable.
In one post, Wallace first notes that the simple moral dictates that we find in the Ten Commandments (don’t kill, don’t lie, etc.) are insufficient because sometimes these actions are justified. How do we escape from this moral morass? He offers this rule:

When we simply insert the expression “for the fun of it” into our descriptions of these moral actions, we discover the objective moral foundation to these claims. [With this applied to killing and lying], we’ve just discovered two objective moral absolutes.

So we shouldn’t kill or lie just for fun. I confess that I’m unimpressed. Do we now have a useful moral roadmap where we didn’t before? Does this rule illuminate issues that frustrate society like abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage, and capital punishment so that the correct path is now clear to all?
Nope. We’re no wiser than we were before. And note that the Nazis didn’t kill Jews just for fun, so this rule does nothing to help Keller’s example.
The point of this exercise is only to spit out yet another example that we can all agree to. Keller pointed out that exterminating Jews was bad, and Wallace points out that killing or lying without justification is bad. I’m sure we all agree with these claims, but this isn’t news. Nothing has been illuminated.
And the correct answer is …
The problem, of course, is the remarkable claim of moral truth grounded outside humanity—“moral values that are valid and binding whether anybody believes in them or not” as William Lane Craig defines it. Why would you pick this explanation? A far more plausible explanation is morality as a combination of

  • a fixed part (moral programming that we all pretty much share since we’re the same species) and
  • a variable part (social mores).

This explains morality completely without an appeal to the supernatural.
Wallace next anticipates some reactions to his position.
What do we do when two groups disagree on a moral issue?
Wallace first imagines Martin Luther King and the civil rights movement.

When a society defines an objective moral truth and the vast majority of its members agree, on what basis can a lone reformer make a call for change?

Obviously not through an appeal to an objective moral truth. If such a truth were accessible to all of us, how could we be in disagreement? Or does Wallace imagine that objective moral truth is not reliably accessible? But if it’s inaccessible, what good is it?
Wallace puzzles over how MLK could’ve caused change, but where’s the difficulty? History tells how it happened. America is not a simple democracy where the majority rules. We have a Bill of Rights that protects the minority against the tyranny of the majority. We have a free press. And we have a long history of (slowly) changing our minds on moral issues.
The majority opinion is that and nothing more. The moral claim “Jim Crow laws are wrong” is grounded only by everyone who agrees with the statement. It’s not objective moral truth.
Next, what about two societies that disagree? He gives as an example the Nuremburg trials of Nazi war criminals, during which a prosecutor said, “There is a law above the law.” Yes, that sounds like an appeal to objective morality, but that appeal is no more supported by this guy than by Wallace himself. The laws used during the trials came from the Allies, not from God.
Since morality changes, doesn’t this overturn the idea of objective morality?
Wallace gives an anecdote about four witnesses with conflicting descriptions of a purse snatcher. Does this disagreement mean that there was no purse snatcher? No, Wallace says, and similarly, disagreement about what objective moral truth is doesn’t mean that it doesn’t exist.
But if we can’t agree on the description of the purse snatcher, then why bring up objective truth? All you’ve shown is that the description is inaccessible, so why bring up “objective” anything?
And back to our subject, if different people give different answers to today’s moral issues, where does “objective” fit in? There may be an objectively correct resolution to each, but we can’t access it. The Big Book of Moral Truth is locked up in God’s library.
Wallace might’ve given us slightly more than other apologists, but this is woefully insufficient to overturn the obvious natural explanation of morality.

Can God make a rock so heavy that hitting His head with it 
would explain the change in personality He underwent 
between the Old Testament and the New Testament?
— commenter GubbaBumpkin

(This is an update of a post that originally appeared 8/21/13.)